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DATE: TUESDAY February 10, 1987

PAGE: A01 EDITION: FINAL

SECTION: NATIONAL

GRAPHICS: PHOTO

SOURCE: By Tim Weiner, Inquirer Staff Writer *215-854-2000*

MEMO: THE\*PENTAGON'S\*SECRET\*CACHE\*

Last in a series

LENGTH: LONG

COVERT FORCES MULTIPLY, SOME RUN AMOK

A dashing and much-decorated lieutenant colonel found himself in deep trouble in November.

His superiors had called him to account for millions of dollars drawn from the\*Pentagon's\*'black budget.' The funds were for covert operations. He had used front companies, secret bank accounts, laundered money. Unconventional ways of doing business. His superiors pressed him for answers. His explanations didn't add up.

The dashing lieutenant colonel in question was not running arms to Iran. But his troubles foreshadowed that foreign-policy snafu.

Lt. Col. Dale C. Duncan of the Army's Special Operations Division ran a mission code-named Yellow Fruit. Housed in an ordinary-looking business office in the Washington suburbs, it was to provide undercover financing and security for covert Army units operating overseas.

The mission had run amok. Duncan stood before a secret court-martial Nov. 10 in a tiny, tightly guarded room at the Army's Intelligence and Security Command in Virginia. The charges against him were serious: forgery, theft and obstruction of justice. And military justice was severe: 10 years in prison and a \$50,000 fine.

Duncan's case was only one in a series of\*Pentagon\*investigations into how secret military forces had spent hundreds of millions of dollars over the last six years. The investigations revealed abuses of money and power in covert \*Pentagon\*operations at home and abroad.

Now, after the revelations of back-channel deals to deliver\*Pentagon\*arms to Iran, and high-profile CIA support for the Nicaraguan rebels in Central America, the work of Duncan and his covert cohorts appears to be part of a

larger pattern.

For the secret inquests at the\*Pentagon\*and the public controversy over the CIA's operations have a common root: All were part of a surge in covert action undertaken by the Reagan administration, action often concealed from Congress - and all were funded through the black budget, the\*Pentagon's\*cache\*of secret funds shielded from public scrutiny.

'This administration has overstressed covert action. They have tried to do too much,' said former CIA director Stansfield Turner, a firm believer in the uses of secret operations.

'They have not limited covert action to situations where you have some chance of succeeding. They have undertaken covert actions so large and so controversial that they leaked out, they became overt,' Turner said. 'It has done some damage.'

Today,\*Pentagon\*spending for covert operations around the world totals at least \$2 billion, the most since the height of the Vietnam War, according to congressional overseers and military analysts. The money is split among the CIA and a host of secret\*Pentagon\*forces skilled in espionage, sabotage, psychological warfare and even the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The\*Pentagon's\*black budget finances the CIA's covert actions and the CIA director's contingency fund to support such operations. Together, these hidden accounts have more than doubled since 1981. The CIA's share of the \$2 billion for covert action has reached at least \$750 million a year, according to congressional sources who oversee the intelligence community. From El Salvador to Ethiopia, from Afghanistan to Angola, the black budget has supported more than 50 CIA covert operations around the globe over the last six years.

Beyond the CIA, black-budget funds for\*Pentagon\*covert operations and personnel have skyrocketed under the Reagan administration and now exceed \$1.25 billion a year, according to congressional sources. The bulk of these missions are handled by the Special Operations Forces, whose members include Army Green Berets and Rangers, Navy SEAL commandos and an Air Force wing.

The Special Operations Forces are America's secret soldiers. In peacetime, their main mission is to carry out clandestine operations against foreign powers. Their motto is 'Anything, Anytime, Anywhere, Anyhow.' And their critics say that about sums up the problem.

In Central America, they have helped counterrevolutionaries who are trying to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.

In the United States, they have worked with the FBI, bugging and wiretapping the hotel rooms of visiting Soviet officials, according to congressional sources.

In West Germany and South Korea, they are trained to use small nuclear land mines called 'backpack nukes' for sabotage, according to congressional records.

Hundreds of millions of dollars are being spent to buy weapons and equipment designed expressly for them: Polaris nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines converted to carry commandos, laser-guided weapons, sophisticated intelligence-gathering equipment, and the like.

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger has told Congress that building up Special Operations Forces is 'one of this administration's highest priorities,' and the\*Pentagon\*and Congress have spent the money to fulfill that desire. The\*Pentagon\*plans to have 20,000 covert soldiers by 1989. The forces' unclassified budget has risen from \$440 million in 1981 to a requested

\$2.5 billion this year.

Part of this unclassified budget is channeled into covert activities undertaken by the Special Operations Forces. Separate black-budget funding also supports secret Special Operations missions, according to staff members of congressional oversight committees who spoke on condition of anonymity.

As the special forces' budgets have grown, so has their power. Today they are the American forces used most often around the world. They are "the only force we are actively using today to meet the Soviet challenge," Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Noel C. Koch has told Congress.

Ties between the\*Pentagon's\*Special Operations Forces and the CIA appear to have grown stronger than at any time since the incursions of U.S. forces into Laos and Cambodia during the Vietnam War. In the eyes of some members of Congress, the close ties are calculated to allow the CIA to evade congressional oversight.

That is because the Special Operations Forces have one freedom the CIA does not: They are not required to report their covert activities to Congress. "There's a real danger that these special forces could be used by CIA programs and thus skirt congressional review," said Sen. Jim Sasser (D., Tenn.).

And, although the CIA is supposed to inform Congress of its covert operations, the CIA, under director William J. Casey, interpreted that requirement loosely. Working to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, mining the Nicaraguan port of Corinto, supporting the Nicaraguan contra rebels, the CIA has consistently acted without informing Congress, straining the bounds of its charter.

As just one example of that strain, the CIA last week forced its station chief in Costa Rica to retire. The agency decided that the station chief had lied about the depth of his involvement with Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, the National Security Council aide who was fired in November for shipping arms to Iran and then reportedly diverting funds to the contras. The CIA station chief apparently worked closely with North to funnel aid to the contras when such military assistance was forbidden by Congress.

The investigations of how military men and CIA agents have collaborated on ill-fated and possibly illegal foreign-policy initiatives are continuing. Already they have put a spotlight on the CIA, and have suggested that its operations have grown beyond the laws intended to control them.

But little attention has focused on the\*Pentagon\*investigations into the use and abuse of covert military operations. Those internal inquiries have found financial or political wrongdoing in four secret military units, including Duncan's, detachments of highly motivated soldiers whose influence grew strong in the Reagan years, nurtured by hundreds of millions of dollars from secret\*Pentagon\*accounts.

'THE CRAZIES IN THE BASEMENT'

Ronald Reagan came to office in 1981 on the day Iran released Americans held hostage for more than a year. He vowed repeatedly to strengthen American forces so that the United States never again would be humiliated by a hostile nation.

Out of this vow sprang a host of new military and intelligence initiatives. The CIA would be given new freedom and new vigor. The armed forces would have billions upon billions of dollars in new funds. There would be new faces, new missions, new forces.

No public record of these investigations is known to exist. What is known is that Yellow Fruit, Seaspray and the Delta Force all reported to a group called the Intelligence Support Activity.

#### THE ACTIVITY

The Intelligence Support Activity was a secret spy squad, with a corps of at least 250 officers, that the \*Pentagon\* created in 1981 behind Congress' back, according to interviews with several congressional investigators.

The group rose from the ashes of the failed attempt to rescue Americans held hostage in Iran in 1979 and 1980.

During the hostage crisis, according to congressional sources and military analysts, the CIA had almost no one in Iran to provide what it calls 'human intelligence,' the kind of information that satellites and other high-tech sources cannot gather. Its ability to spy on Iran was crippled. The military was being asked to mount a dangerous assault in a strange country without crucial information.

So the \*Pentagon\* formed an ad hoc unit to gather intelligence for Operation Eagle Claw, the Iran hostage-rescue mission.

Eagle Claw was a disaster. The mission aborted in death and destruction as aircraft collided in the Iranian desert. Among the lessons the \*Pentagon\* decided it had learned from the failure was this: Never improvise espionage for such a mission. The military concluded that it needed a permanent, unified, covert group to coordinate paramilitary actions and intelligence-gathering.

Thus the Intelligence Support Activity was born.

Its members simply called it 'the Activity.' It was formed shortly after Reagan took office in 1981, according to one congressional source, with at least \$10 million in seed money from the Special Operations Forces budget.

Two officers who are said to have participated in the Activity were Lt. Col. Oliver L. North and Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord.

North was the National Security Council's point man on covert operations. His energies helped convert the NSC from a body that assisted in making policy through painstaking analysis into an operational wing of the CIA and the \*Pentagon.\* Secord would emerge as a central figure in the Iran arms deal, sharing a secret Swiss bank account with North. He was an Air Force commander with a rich background in covert actions dating back to the 1960s, when he worked with the CIA in directing a secret air war in Laos.

In the first months of the Reagan administration, North and Secord began working together on the controversial \$8 billion sale of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radar planes to Saudi Arabia. The sale apparently generated several hundred million in extra Saudi funds to support U.S.-backed guerrillas in Afghanistan and Central America.

In December 1981 and January 1982, North worked with the Activity on attempts to free Brig. Gen. James L. Dozier, a senior American NATO officer kidnapped for six weeks by Red Brigades terrorists in Italy.

The Activity worked on many of the \*Pentagon's\* most sensitive missions, first and foremost of which was to support the Nicaraguan contras. There also were covert actions undertaken in Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East, according to intelligence analysts.

Then, in March 1983, the Activity's cover was inadvertently blown by a former special forces lieutenant colonel testifying before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee.

Retired Lt. Col. James "Bo" Gritz told the subcommittee an amazing story. Gritz had long contended that some American soldiers missing in action were still alive in Laos. He told Congress that he had worked with the Activity on plans for a secret mission to find these Americans, if they existed.

"The Activity was a field unit and would have put an American across into Laos to verify, using various recording means, the presence of Americans thought to be at specified locations," Gritz testified.

There was a problem with Gritz's testimony. Congress never had heard of anything called "the Activity" and was disturbed to learn that the\*Pentagon\* had a secret detachment of spies and Rambo prototypes running around the world.

Congress was not opposed to such missions - far from it. Congress during the Reagan years has supported them with hundreds of millions of dollars. But Congress said it wanted to be told about espionage activities, preferably in advance. That is the law.

A subsequent investigation by Lt. Gen. William Odom, now the head of the National Security Agency, apparently determined that the Intelligence Support Activity was out of control. There was little or no oversight, and there were some bizarre financial doings. For example, the investigation found that, for reasons unknown, Special Forces officers bought a Rolls-Royce and a hot-air balloon from federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents.

There followed something of a purge of officers associated with the Activity, according to military and intelligence observers.

Secord left the\*Pentagon\*in May 1983 to become a private arms dealer and consultant. He quickly secured a \$1,260-a-week consulting job with the \*Pentagon's\*Office of Special Operations. In the fall of 1983, the \*Pentagon\* hired him as a member of the Special Operations Policy Advisory Group, a group of retired generals who were asked to provide "disinterested, expert advice" on covert actions. While he advised the\*Pentagon,\* he dealt in the international arms market and secretly worked with North on supplying the contras.

No one seems to know exactly what became of the Activity. Did it cease to exist after its cover was blown? Was it renamed and reshuffled? Were its members swallowed up by the revitalized Special Operations Forces? \*Pentagon\* officials deny anything called "the Activity" existed in the first place, so they cannot confirm or deny its continued existence. Congressional overseers don't know or can't say.

#### SECRET WEAPONS, SECRET WARS

The embarrassing realization that Congress didn't know of the Activity opened an old wound. Salved and partly healed, it was ripped open again and again by other revelations that caught Congress by surprise - the administration's secret mining of Nicaraguan harbors in 1984, the secret arms deals with Iran, the secret flow of aid to the contras in apparent defiance of a congressional ban.

Old questions without clear answers are being asked again. How does an espionage agency function in an open society? How much control should Congress have over covert operations? Who decides what should be kept secret?

In William J. Casey's CIA, the answers were clear.

The now-retired CIA director said he did not want a low-profile agency, he wanted "a no-profile agency," as he told an interviewer in 1983. But the sweep of the CIA's missions under Casey may have sabotaged that desire,

according to Turner and other intelligence professionals.

Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.) of the Senate Intelligence Committee said Casey's flaw as CIA director was that "he so strongly supported covert actions - in fact, substituted covert-action policies for foreign policy - in a way that built up a layer of distrust."

Casey's mandate was to rebuild a CIA that had been damaged by discoveries of misconduct and repeatedly reined in during the 1970s. The resurgence of the CIA began the day Reagan was inaugurated as President. The director of central intelligence was given a new status: the rank of cabinet member. Under Casey's leadership, the CIA's budget doubled since 1981. Funds for covert actions grew even faster than the overall CIA budget.

And the mumbling, oblique testimony Casey gave Congress kept legislators in the dark about some of the CIA's biggest and most controversial missions.

"It's important to understand the contempt Casey has for Congress and the whole oversight process," a former high-ranking intelligence official said in an interview before Casey's resignation last week.

Covert operations, cut back to a bare minimum under Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter, soared in number and scope: Iran, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Chad, Cambodia and Lebanon were some of the sites for the more than 50 covert operations launched under Casey, the most since the days of Vietnam.

Congress has limited powers to oversee covert action. Since 1974, the law is that the president must "find" the action "important to the national security of the United States," and that certain members of Congress must be informed of his finding "in a timely manner." The president legally can restrict knowledge of covert action to eight members of the Senate and the House: the chairmen and vice chairmen of the intelligence committees, and the majority and minority leaders.

Of course, he also can violate this understanding, as many in Congress contend President Reagan did in authorizing arms shipments to Iran.

"It's a process that allows the executive branch to make law," said a senior congressional overseer of the intelligence community. "At its worst, it is an erosion of democracy."

Now Casey has retired and lies gravely ill in a Washington hospital while a firestorm of criticism grows over the CIA's role in swapping weapons for hostages with Iran.

And Congress once again is struggling to define its power to oversee the uses and abuses of secret funds, secret weapons and secret wars.

GRAPHICS: PHOTO (2)

1. Navy SEAL commandos take part in a training exercise. Black-budget funds for special forces have risen sharply. (U.S. NAVY)

2. Caspar W. Weinberger; Planning for 20,000 secret soldiers

KEYWORDS: SERIES RONALD REAGAN GOVERNMENT FINANCE DEFENSE

US NUCLEAR WEAPON MILITARY

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

DATE: MONDAY February 9, 1987

PAGE: A01 EDITION: FINAL

SECTION: NATIONAL

LENGTH: LONG

GRAPHICS: PHOTO AND DIAGRAM

SOURCE: By Tim Weiner, Inquirer Staff Writer

MEMO: THE\*PENTAGON'S\*SECRET\*CACHE\*

Second in a series

TOMORROW: America's secret soldiers.

PLANNING FOR WORLD WAR IV

On Dec. 4, an Atlas-Centaur rocket blasted off from Cape Canaveral. It carried the first space test of Milstar, a multibillion-dollar satellite system funded by the\*Pentagon's\*secret 'black budget.'

Milstar is the centerpiece of a \$40 billion plan to prepare for World War IV.

Four?

Four. Since 1981, shortly after President Reagan took office, the fundamental U.S. defense strategy has been to be able to fight and win a six-month nuclear conflict - World War III - and remain strong enough afterward to strike again.

Long after the White House and\*Pentagon\*are reduced to rubble and much of civilization is destroyed, the strategy would call for computers to run a war no human mind could control, orchestrating space satellites and nuclear weapons over a global battlefield.

The strategy envisions generals huddled in underground bunkers, aloft in converted 747s and speeding down interstate highways in lead-lined tractor-trailers. These nuclear-war command posts would harbor computer terminals linked to space satellites that would help direct nuclear missiles from silos and submarines.

The key to this strategy, the\*Pentagon\*maintains, is to build a computerized communications network that can command and control the nation's nuclear forces during and after World War III.

The\*Pentagon\*calls this network 'C3I' (pronounced see-cubed-eye), shorthand for command, control, communications and intelligence. Part of a \$222 billion plan to modernize the nation's nuclear forces, C3I would become America's central nervous system for nuclear war, the brain that controls the brawn of missiles, bombers and submarines.

Increasingly, major components of the nuclear C3I system, such as Milstar, have been hidden in the black budget, the\*Pentagon's\*secret funds for classified projects. Naturally, this has severely limited congressional oversight and public awareness of the new network.

And as billions and billions for C3I disappear into the black budget, less and less is known about the ultimate cost and structure of the nation's nuclear strategy.

New C3I systems hidden in the black budget include:

\* The Milstar system of satellites, orbiting 70,000 miles above the earth, receiving and relaying commands to launch nuclear weapons.

\* Satellite sensors designed to guide nuclear missiles in flight, track their progress and report back on the damage they inflict.

\* Tractor-trailers hauling nuclear command posts, dodging Soviet attacks on the open road.

The ultimate cost of these three black programs alone may exceed \$30 billion.

C3I projects still in the unclassified \*Pentagon\* budget include:

\* Robots that can gallop like horses and walk like men, carrying out computerized orders as they roam the radioactive battlefield.

\* A nationwide network of 500 radio stations that could broadcast orders to nuclear-missile silos and underground bunkers.

\* A search for ways to protect crucial computers from the effects of nuclear weapons.

Take Milstar, just one component, although a crucial one, of C3I. For years, the Milstar project gathered dust in the \*Pentagon's\* files. It was considered impossibly expensive.

But the Reagan administration's military buildup has brought it from the drawing board to the launching pad.

Since 1984, the administration has spent at least \$1.5 billion to develop the space satellites and other communications equipment for Milstar. Military analysts estimate the ultimate cost of Milstar at between \$15 billion and \$20 billion.

The true cost will remain a secret. Last year, the Milstar satellites disappeared in the \*Pentagon's\* black budget, where they are less likely to face scrutiny from Congress and critics.

Milstar would work like this, if it works at all, in a nuclear war:

Imagine two networks, one in space, one on earth. The first is a constellation of eight satellites, strategically placed in orbits around the earth, 70,000 miles or more in space. The satellites connect with the second network, thousands of radios and computer terminals in underground bunkers, missile silos, submarines, tractor-trailers and airborne command posts.

Milstar would be the global nuclear-communications switchboard, connecting all the command stations during and after World War III, receiving and relaying the launch orders for nuclear weapons.

This concept - 'connectivity' - is the buzzword for the 1980s at the \*Pentagon\* and the basis for the C3I network.

All commanders dream of ways to pierce the fog of war, to obtain intelligence fresh from the battlefield, to give orders that will be carried out instantly, to communicate with fellow officers. To command. As Gen. Thomas Power, the legendary head of the Strategic Air Command in the 1950s, put it: 'Without communications, all I command is my desk.'

\*Pentagon\* officials have told Congress that Milstar's satellites and terminals will provide 'connectivity' for months after nuclear war erupts.

Milstar would connect the nation's military leaders with the commander-in-chief. If the president escapes from Washington in the 'doomsday plane,' a converted 747 intended to evacuate the president from Washington, he could use Milstar to order nuclear-submarine commanders thousands of miles away to hit Soviet targets in Moscow or Vladivostok.

If Washington is destroyed and the president, vice president and secretary of defense are killed, the new nuclear commander-in-chief will be an Air Force general already aloft in a modified 707. (Continuously, in peacetime or in

nuclear missiles and bombers.

The \*Pentagon\* still has not solved one problem that might prevent the "doomsday" and Looking Glass planes from playing their crucial roles throughout a six-month nuclear war: The planes cannot remain aloft for more than 72 hours before their lubricants run out and their engines die.

If the airborne command posts fail, Milstar would transmit that information to generals in the \*Pentagon's\* alternative command center, deep underground in the Catoclin Mountains near Raven Rock, Pa. Then these generals could take control, using the satellites to transmit orders telling troops to evacuate cities, or to fire MX warheads from silos in Wyoming.

When it is completed, Milstar will join two other nuclear-war-fighting systems in space.

Navstar, also known as the Global Positioning System, was canceled by the Carter administration but resurrected in 1982. It is expected to be completed by 1990 at an estimated final cost of \$8 billion to \$12 billion.

Navstar's 18 satellites will play a crucial role in a nuclear war. Their computer systems will help nuclear weapons hit bull's-eyes. According to congressional testimony, the satellites can guide nuclear missiles and fix them on their targets with accuracies of 50 feet or closer.

How will the U.S. military commanders know if the missiles have accomplished their missions? A set of sensors that will ride piggyback on Navstar satellites will tell them.

The sensors are called IONDS, for Integrated Operational Nuclear Detection System. \*Pentagon\* officials have told Congress that the sensors are designed to survey the global battlefield, pinpoint nuclear explosions, assess the damage and report the results back to commanders in airborne posts and underground bunkers.

Like Milstar satellites, the nuclear-detection technology for IONDS is being developed mostly under black-budget financing. Its ultimate cost is unknown.

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While much about the C3I technology's role in nuclear policy remains classified, several aspects seem clear:

The new generation of C3I satellites is a step toward the militarization of space. The C3I network gives computers an ever-growing power over nuclear forces. The technology remains uncertain until tested in nuclear war. And the multibillion-dollar projects hidden in the black budget still represent only a small down payment on a C3I system that can endure a long nuclear war.

"One reason the black budget is growing so fast is the Reagan administration believes it can win a nuclear war," said Gene LaRocque, the retired Navy admiral who directs the watchdog group Center for Defense Information in Washington. "We've moved away from a policy of deterrence, where you want your enemy to know what you've got. If you want to win a nuclear war, you've got to keep your capabilities a secret."

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger has told Congress that the C3I network is "perhaps the most urgently needed element" in the Reagan administration's trillion-dollar military buildup. This urgency stems from a

00435/009

@4 PENTAGON & CACHE

PAGE 10

conflict, a general and battle staff from the Strategic Air Command are in flight over the Midwest in one of several planes code-named Looking Glass.)

Messages sent through Milstar would tell the Looking Glass commander if Washington was gone. He would then use Milstar to coordinate the nation's

shift in the nation's nuclear-war-fighting strategy.

Shortly after President Reagan took office, in October 1981, he signed a secret "finding" called National Security Decision Directive 13. While the text of NSDD-13 remains a secret, its meaning is not. The strategy it proclaimed has been repeated in the testimony of \*Pentagon\* officials before Congress and in scores of published works by military analysts.

That strategy says the idea of a one-day nuclear war is outmoded. It says that 20 million or more Americans can die in World War III, and the United States will still survive as a nation. It says the United States should have the power to control the escalation of a long-drawn-out nuclear war and force a Soviet surrender. And it says the new C3I network must then control a reserve of nuclear forces large enough to allow the nation to fight again.

The strategy relies heavily on space-based C3I platforms such as Milstar and Navstar. International treaties forbid the military use of space. Congress has asked \*Pentagon\* officials whether their plans violate these agreements. The \*Pentagon\* has replied, in a statement with Orwellian overtones, that the United States interprets "the right to use space for peaceful purposes to include military uses of space to promote peace in the world." And Congress has funded the satellites.

\*

Back on earth, the \*Pentagon's\* C3I plans depend on ways to keep commanders alive.

In an all-out nuclear war, \*Pentagon\* planners realize, few major command posts would avoid direct nuclear hits. The Soviet Union knows where to find crucial nerve centers such as the \*Pentagon\* and the Strategic Air Command headquarters in Nebraska.

Figuring that a moving target is harder to hit, the \*Pentagon\* has a \$3 billion investment in mobile command posts under way. The idea, the \*Pentagon\* has told Congress, is to have a large number of C3I centers that the Soviets cannot target. This is the thinking behind a project code-named Island Sun.

It is a plan to create convoys of tractor-trailers in which generals could operate computerized command posts after nuclear war begins, according to congressional testimony by Defense Secretary Weinberger. Just how the trucks would operate - for example, where they might refuel or change a flat tire - is unknown, because the project is classified. However, the \*Pentagon\* budget shows that Island Sun has absorbed \$165 million in research-and-development funds over the past four years.

Island Sun is one of many related C3I projects to create mobile ground terminals, linked through Milstar, that in effect would be tiny Pentagons coordinating the nation's nuclear forces as they dodge Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles on the highways, on freight trains and aboard merchant ships at sea.

But Milstar and its ground terminals are not the only way to coordinate the nuclear arsenal. The \*Pentagon\* plans to spend nearly \$1 billion on creating an enduring conventional communications system, one so large and containing so many parts that the Soviet Union could never eliminate it.

The system is called GWEN, the Ground Wave Emergency Network. GWEN is planned as a network of up to 500 unmanned radio towers. At least 50 are already in place near towns and cities including Aurora, Colo.; Manhattan, Kan.; Fayetteville, Ark., and Gettysburg, Pa. Each station has a range of several hundred miles and can relay messages to sister stations, creating a

national network, Radio GWEN.

GWEN's programming would include orders to launch nuclear weapons. It would link early-warning radars, missile silos, air bases, submarines, underground bunkers, Strategic Air Command headquarters and the\*Pentagon.\*

The genius of GWEN, according to\*Pentagon\*planners, is that the Soviets cannot possibly destroy all 500 towers. There will be so many GWEN relay stations and switching routes that the system should endure during and after a nuclear attack. And if it falters, balloons carrying compatible radio antennas could be inflated and sent aloft.

\*

Another question the\*Pentagon\*is grappling with as it tries to create a nuclear-war-fighting network is the human factor. Would soldiers carry out their roles in the heat of nuclear battle? The\*Pentagon\*is researching ways to educate soldiers to "understand the impact of enemy nuclear firepower" and to "prepare them to cope with operations on the nuclear battlefield," according to congressional testimony.

And where the human mind and body cannot cope with nuclear war, the\*Pentagon's\*planners tell Congress, computers will. They will play a very large role in the command and control of nuclear forces.

Thinking machines can supplant privates and generals alike in wartime, according to the\*Pentagon's\*Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which notes in its 1987 budget that "computers can assist, advise and/or relieve military personnel in complex decision-making tasks (which are) dangerous or rapidly changing."

"Computers are extremely important," the\*Pentagon's\*former director of ballistic missile defense, Jacob Gilstein, has told Congress. "No human being can enter the real-time decision-making loop and control the system. It has to be pre-programmed with logic so the computer can make the decision and run the game."

Just as computers will have to do the thinking in nuclear war, computer-controlled robot soldiers may have to do the grunt work in the nuclear battlefield.

DARPA is working on a variety of robots - "hexapods" that move with a tank's agility and speed, "quadrupeds" that gallop and trot, "walking vehicles," and robot hands and fingers. It is using increasing amounts of money and manpower to develop robot intelligence, focusing on "flexible software systems that show unique promise for solving complex military problems." Commanders will communicate with robots through "a state-of-the-art man-machine interface called IRUS," according to DARPA's budget.

DARPA envisions a robot soldier of the future that takes orders "but does not generate discourse" - no back talk or balking. The new generation of robot soldiers eventually will give commanders the ability to have their commands carried out in "an enhanced nuclear environment" - the\*Pentagon's\* language for a lethally radioactive battlefield.

A multibillion-dollar effort is under way to protect everything from underground bunkers to airborne command posts against the varied effects of nuclear explosions. But the most immediate danger to C3I is not the radiation of nuclear weapons, or the blast, or the firestorm. It is a much-discussed, little-understood phenomenon called the electromagnetic pulse, or EMP.

Nuclear experts disagree emphatically on the effects of EMP, and the possibility of defending against it. They only agree that it is a real

phenomenon.

A nuclear blast high in the atmosphere creates an enormous electromagnetic charge, a wave of intense lightning bathing the land below in an electric storm. This pulse was experienced in Hawaii in 1962, when the U.S. exploded three high-altitude nuclear weapons over the Pacific. Although the test took place 800 miles away, street lights went off across Oahu and burglar alarms went haywire in Honolulu.

The implications for C3I are far more serious. The entire structure of C3I rests on computers. If the computers cannot function during nuclear war, almost nothing will. Those who consider EMP a grave threat say it could disrupt every computer chip in the system, overloading low-voltage circuits with a tremendous burst of high-voltage energy. In theory, the network could be undone by a single nuclear bomb.

Realizing that every minute counts in nuclear war, the\*Pentagon\*is seeking ways to prevent C3I from being temporarily disconnected by the electromagnetic pulse.

The cables that connect Minuteman missile silos to their launch centers are encased in six inches of lead. At Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, \*Pentagon\*scientists shoot 10 million volts of electricity through aircraft and electronic equipment, testing ways to protect them. The president's 'doomsday plane' has \$100 million worth of EMP shielding. Every C3I satellite will have some form of EMP armor.

All the parts of C3I - the computers, the Milstar satellites, the mobile ground stations and the rest - appear technologically feasible to the \*Pentagon.\*The trick will be in weaving them all together into one durable war machine.

As of now, the\*Pentagon\*has told Congress it has 'high confidence' that the C3I network will 'endure through trans- and post-attack phases of a Soviet nuclear strike.'

\*

But nobody really knows if the C3I system will work. And no one will, until a full-scale nuclear war erupts.

Skeptics inside and outside the military say neither the tens of billions already spent nor the tens of billions needed to complete what has begun will buy the C3I network the\*Pentagon\*wants.

They say the\*Pentagon\*'s vision of the ultimate nuclear-war machine is an illusion.

The goal of a durable C3I system - one that would last for weeks and months during a long nuclear war - 'will cost tens of billions of dollars over and beyond what we are spending today . . . and it is not clear how long such a system would endure,' warned Charles A. Zraket, executive vice president of the Mitre Corp., the nation's premier C3I think tank.

The\*Pentagon\*is undaunted. 'They've consistently sent the signal: They want an enduring system. They've told the weapons and systems designers to do it. And they've driven the designers crazy,' said John Steinbruner, a C3I expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

'The designers don't know how to do it, even spending tens or hundreds of billions of dollars,' Steinbruner said. 'We do not know how to build a system that could endure a large-scale attack. But the money's being spent, no question about it.'

Upon his retirement in 1982, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Gen. David Jones, told Congress that the military was throwing money into 'a bottomless pit' by planning for a nuclear war of controlled scale and duration.

'I don't see much chance of nuclear war being limited or protracted,' he said.

Very little unclassified information exists about the\*Pentagon's\*post-World War III plans. But the question was addressed many years ago by the man who discovered the power of the atom. Albert Einstein once was asked what weapons would be used to fight a third world war. Einstein replied that he really didn't know, but he had an idea what weapons would be used in World War IV.

'Sticks and stones,' Einstein said.

GRAPHICS: PHOTO (1)

1. A rocket blasts off with the first test of the Milstar satellite network. (NASA)

DIAGRAM (1)

1. C3I: A vision of nuclear war (SOURCES: Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers Spectrum, TRW; The Philadelphia Inquirer / KIRK MONTGOMERY)

KEYWORDS: SERIES US GOVERNMENT FINANCE DEFENSE BUDGET  
NUCLEAR WEAPON SPACE COMPUTER COST MILITARY RONALD REAGAN

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DB = FI7 DOCNO = 92987

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

DATE: SUNDAY February 8, 1987

PAGE: A01 EDITION: FINAL

SECTION: NATIONAL

LENGTH: LONG

GRAPHICS: PHOTO, CHART AND DIAGRAM

SOURCE: By Tim Weiner, Inquirer Staff Writer

MEMO: THE\*PENTAGON'S\*SECRET\*CACHE\*

First in a series

TOMORROW: A \$40 billion plan for World War IV.

A GROWING 'BLACK BUDGET' PAYS FOR SECRET WEAPONS, COVERT WARS

Two years ago, a startling item appeared in President Reagan's budget. It was a military project code-named Aurora, and no further description or explanation was given. But Aurora caught people's attention anyway. That's because the projected budget showed its cost soaring from \$80 million in 1986 to \$2.3 billion in 1987.

What sort of project grows like that?

Not one the\*Pentagon\*wants to talk about.

In the administration's defense budget this year, there is no mention of Aurora. The project and its billions have 'gone black' - vanished into the vast\*cache\*of secret accounts that the\*Pentagon\*calls its 'black budget.'

Since President Reagan took office in 1981, his administration has more than tripled the black budget. This secret spending for classified programs

now totals at least \$35 billion a year, according to an Inquirer investigation of Defense Department records, corroborated by \*Pentagon\* and congressional sources. It now accounts for 11 percent of the \*Pentagon's\* current \$312 billion spending request, and that number is bound to swell, for the black budget is growing faster than any other major sector of the federal government.

The \*Pentagon\* says nothing publicly about the black budget, and most members of Congress have no access to details about it.

Under the cloak of black-budget secrecy, the Reagan administration is spending billions on nuclear bombers and millions to train dolphins as underwater saboteurs. It has developed elaborate plans for winning a months-long nuclear war - World War III - and preparing for World War IV. The plans include robots stalking radioactive battlegrounds, satellites orchestrating nuclear attacks and generals speeding along interstates in lead-lined trucks, ordering warheads fired from faraway silos.

The black budget also funds a host of secret weapons, covert military units, one-quarter of all military research and development and at least three-quarters of the U.S. intelligence community's espionage and covert activities.

The black budget is split about evenly between funds for secret weapons and funds for intelligence agencies. The military's portion alone has grown eightfold, to at least \$17 billion, since Reagan took office.

The portion of the U.S. intelligence budget hidden away in the \*Pentagon's\* secret accounts has doubled to at least \$18 billion under the Reagan administration. And no part of the intelligence budget has grown faster than funds for covert operations - currently more than \$600 million a year, according to intelligence analysts.

The controversy swirling in Washington over the covert sale of weapons to Iran and the diversion of millions of dollars in profit to contra forces in Nicaragua shows how the secret use of secret funds can undermine trust in government, warp foreign policy and damage a presidency - when it is detected.

The spending of those millions to finance secret wars has now raised congressional hackles, but the spending of billions to finance secret weapons continues to grow largely unchecked.

The black budget now is nearly as big as the entire federal budget for health care. It is far bigger than the federal budget for education or transportation or agriculture or the environment.

The black budget's fastest-growing component is secret spending on military research and development. Now approaching \$11 billion, it has increased 1,357 percent under Reagan. It is three times bigger than the entire budget for the State Department. And no end is in sight.

This is growth that foreshadows huge future increases in the overall black budget, for research and development is the acorn from which the defense oak grows. So the secret spending will only accelerate as such projects as Aurora - which was a code name for the \$60 billion Stealth bomber project - go from the drawing board to the assembly line.

National-security laws forbid any public debate in Congress that would reveal specific weapons or specific dollars or, for that matter, specific foul-ups in the black budget.

Thomas Amlie, a \*Pentagon\* missile expert with security clearances high enough to know about some black programs, says the military has "three basic

reasons for having them. One, you're doing something that should genuinely be secret. There's only a couple of those, and Stealth ain't one of them.

"Two, you're doing something so damn stupid you don't want anybody to know about it.

"And three, you want to rip the moneybag open and get out a shovel, because there is no accountability whatsoever."

As a consequence, critics say, the black budget is far more vulnerable than the rest of the defense budget to shoddy work, inflated bills and outright fraud by contractors and subcontractors. Rep. John D. Dingell (D., Mich.), whose House Energy and Commerce Committee is trying to penetrate the secrecy surrounding\*Pentagon\*spending, said flatly that the black budget "conceals outright illegal activities."

"The\*Pentagon\*keeps these programs of almost unbelievable size secret from Congress, from the General Accounting Office, from its own auditing agencies," Dingell said. "And every time they have kept secrets from us, the facts, when they come out, have been surrounded by a bodyguard of lies."

Although the few members of Congress who are briefed on the black budget, and the larger number who are not, are growing increasingly unhappy with the system, they have been unable to pierce the\*Pentagon's\*shield of secrecy.

In the U.S. House of Representatives, the chairmen and ranking minority members of committees dealing with military matters receive briefings on black projects. In all, about 30 House members are given limited information about some black programs, according to congressional staff members. Senators overseeing military and intelligence affairs have greater access.

Two of those in the know, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin (D., Wis.) and ranking minority member William Dickinson (R., Ala.), think the\*Pentagon's\*secrecy is unjustified. They have said 70 percent of the black budget could be declassified at no risk to national security.

Black budget is the\*Pentagon's\*own term for projects it hides from public view by classifying their titles, their costs or their objectives. (It does not include the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars," which has been kept out of the black budget so that it can be promoted openly in the political marketplace.)

Black projects are concealed in several ways. In many cases, their costs simply are deleted from the unclassified budget. Some are given code names, such as Bernie, Tacit Rainbow and Elegant Lady, or hidden under innocuous headings such as "special activities" and "advanced concepts."

For example, the fiscal 1988 Air Force procurement budget includes a line item of \$4.7 billion for "selected activities," \$3.1 billion for "other production charges" and \$2.3 billion for "special programs." That is all that Congress as a whole knows about these three black programs and the \$10.1 billion they will consume.

All told, more than \$25 billion - nearly one-fifth of all\*Pentagon\*spending for developing and producing weapons and materiel - is hidden in the black budgets for research, development and procurement.

These secret programs are financing aircraft, weaponry and military satellites whose final cost will far exceed \$100 billion.

"A fair question would be: What the hell's going on here? This is a tremendous amount of money to be spending with no oversight," said John Steinbruner, an expert on nuclear-war strategy who directs foreign-policy studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington. "Somebody's got to say:

'Hey, are we running a democracy or not? Is the fetish for secrecy undermining the political process?' "

"This is a problem that Congress persistently refuses to face, and the consequences could be very, very serious," said William W. Kauffman, a top defense-budget adviser to Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter. "I think people in Congress don't realize that with the black budget increasing as it is, they've really got an explosive situation on their hands. Either the\*Pentagon\*is going to have to give some of these projects up or we're going to see an explosion in budget authority and outlays."

But few members of Congress have the time or energy to fight the\*Pentagon\* for information on black projects. Several spent more than a year trying to obtain accurate budget data on the Stealth bomber. The\*Pentagon\* finally released five-year-old classified cost figures that many in Congress suspected were misleading.

"They control what the Congress gets and sees," said Rep. Denny Smith (R., Ore.), who calls himself a "cheap hawk," a cost-conscious conservative, on defense issues. "As a congressman, I can't get information. . . . They don't want to have us mucking around in their budget."

"There's a real question here," Smith said. "Will the military accept civilian leadership when it comes to choosing weapons?"

A senior staff member of the House Government Operations Committee said that even what little congressional oversight exists has been weakened by the\*Pentagon's\*budgetary sleight-of-hand. He said the\*Pentagon\*uses a double-ledger system of accounting for black projects in which "brooms become computers" and computers become bombs.

"The\*Pentagon\*gets tremendous benefits from misleading Congress, and very few risks," he said. "As more and more money disappears into these ultrasecret programs, the checks and balances are basically being eroded. . . . Congress has become less and less alert to this. It is abdicating power."

The black budget, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger said at a Jan. 6 news conference, is made up of "funding which we believe it is better for us not to publicize, on the very sound premise that we don't see the purpose of giving additional information to the enemy."

Weinberger, of course, was referring to the Soviet Union. However, many members of Congress believe he had another adversary in mind.

"The attitude of this administration is that Congress is the enemy," said Rep. William H. Gray 3d (D., Pa.), chairman of the House Budget Committee. "So we simply do not get nearly enough information to keep track of these secret accounts. The administration has run wild in this area. They are trying to end-run Congress as if there were no checks and balances in the Constitution. It is a very dangerous policy."

And even the staunchest supporters of national security now are questioning the black budget's growth.

"I know quite a lot of black programs, and many of them are well-managed," said Richard Garwin, a longtime defense consultant and presidential adviser who helped develop the hydrogen bomb. "But the proliferation of these programs is very bad. It is primarily to avert criticism and evaluation. It is part of a general trend of this administration to block information on its programs, whether they be classified or unclassified. And that is profoundly anti-democratic."

Increasingly, the\*Pentagon\*is pushing previously unclassified programs into the black budget. About \$4.5 billion in once-public\*Pentagon\*spending, such as funds for the Milstar space satellites designed to help fight nuclear wars, has vanished into the black budget in the past two years.

"Huge areas have been removed from public debate," said Jeffrey Richelson, a professor at American University in Washington who has written several acclaimed studies on U.S. and Soviet intelligence. "Whole programs have gone black without questions being asked, such as: Do we need these weapons? Will they be destabilizing?"

Richelson said, "The secrecy once reserved for extraordinary programs" - such as the Manhattan Project to build an atomic bomb during World War II - "now has become an everyday, every-time affair."

Why are more and more projects becoming black? The foremost reason is the Reagan administration's desire for secrecy. That has driven the black budget upward more forcefully than any weapon in the\*Pentagon's\*plans.

In 1982, President Reagan signed an executive order revising the procedures for keeping secrets. The order said, in effect, that in balancing the public's right to know against the government's power to keep secrets, secrecy would carry more weight.

The order allows bureaucrats to "reclassify information previously declassified" and forbids them to consider the public's interest in access to government information when deciding to classify a document. Since then, the government has been classifying more documents and declassifying fewer than in previous administrations, according to the federal Information Security Oversight Organization, which monitors classification orders.

But there may be reasons other than secrecy that are driving the black budget higher.

A recent report by a presidential commission on defense-security practices warned that black programs "could be established . . . to avoid competitive procurement processes, normal inspections and oversight." And a senior House Armed Services Committee staffer, Anthony Battista, noted in a 1985 briefing that a multimillion-dollar radar-jamming system was classified to hide the \*Pentagon's\*violation of competitive bidding rules in awarding the contract.

Battista told the Armed Services subcommittee on research and development that the\*Pentagon\*'is putting more and more into . . . the black programs, not because of national security, but simply to skirt the normal acquisition process."

Very few federal investigators have the security clearances necessary to audit black programs, which usually are classified as "sensitive compartmented information," a classification above top secret. There are more than 10,000 such security "compartments," and it is illegal for anyone without that specific clearance to possess knowledge of the program.

That raises the question whether the fiscal abuses revealed in unclassified \*Pentagon\*procurement programs - the \$7,000 coffeepots and \$600 screws - also are occurring in secret.

"In a black project, people don't worry about money," said a systems engineer who has worked on four black projects at the space systems division of Lockheed Missile and Space Co. in Sunnyvale, Calif.

"If you need money, you got it. If you screw up and you need more, you got it," said the engineer, who asked that his name not be published. "You're just pouring money into the thing until you get it right. The incentive isn't

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there to do it right the first time. Who's going to question it?'

Questioning the black budget is difficult for a Congress lacking information. But limits in future defense spending required by the Gramm-Rudman budget-cutting law may force the issue. The law, which is designed to phase out the federal deficit by 1991, says 50 percent of the budget cuts should come from defense spending. And the federal deficit this year will be \$174.5 billion, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office.

Those seeking more bang for the defense buck are concerned that the growing black budget will crowd out defense spending for mundane but crucial things such as boots and bullets.

'What we see in three to four years is a train wreck coming,' said Gordon Adams of the Defense Budget Project, a Washington research organization that analyzes\*Pentagon\*spending. The crash he envisions: rushing headlong in one direction, tens of billions of dollars in immovable black weapons projects; coming the other way on the same track, tens of billions in unstoppable budget cuts mandated by the Gramm-Rudman Law.

'The consequences of that train wreck for national security are enormous,' Adams said. 'What piece of flesh do we cut? Do we mothball part of the Navy? Cut personnel? We will have to make those choices, and all for a black budget we know nothing about.'

But something can be learned about the black budget. The Inquirer reviewed more than 10,000 pages of Defense Department budget documents, studied the congressional testimony of\*Pentagon\*officials and interviewed military and intelligence experts inside and outside of the\*Pentagon\*for this series.

Within the military's black budget, no subject is more controversial or costly than Stealth technology, which is designed to enable aircraft and missiles to elude enemy radar.

Although the technology is a relatively open book - an informative volume on the subject can be bought in the\*Pentagon\*bookstore and accurate models of Stealth fighters can be purchased in toy stores - its true cost remains a state secret. Defense analysts place the combined costs of Stealth projects for Air Force fighters and bombers, nuclear cruise missiles, pilotless drones and Navy attack planes at \$100 billion.

The most costly by far is the Stealth bomber, which is becoming the most expensive weapon in American history. The Air Force wants 132 of the planes delivered by the early 1990s. Most military experts place the bomber's ultimate price at about \$450 million apiece. If that estimate is accurate, the Stealth bombers' total cost will be \$60 billion - a sum equal to the combined annual budgets of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

Stealth-bomber spending may be spread out over several programs to hide its immense size. Now that Aurora has vanished, some analysts say Stealth money is cached in two Air Force line items: 'other production charges - \$3.1 billion' and 'special programs - \$2.3 billion.' Some say it is hidden within the Department of Energy's \$8 billion budget for military programs.

The\*Pentagon\*refuses to disclose the price tag on Stealth technology, saying the Soviets could deduce the status of the projects by tracking the spending. Top\*Pentagon\*officials decline to respond to reports that the Stealth aircraft's heralded radar-evading ability already has been outstripped by advances in radar technology. They have denied in a public hearing before a congressional oversight committee that Stealth aircraft exist.

The hearings stemmed from a series of security lapses and frauds on Stealth

Projects. The Stealth-related criminal cases are only "the tip of the iceberg" of illegal conduct on black projects, said Robert C. Bonner, the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, a hub of secret military contracting.

One engineer hired by Northrop Corp., the lead contractor on the Stealth bomber, was a Florida chain-gang alumnus named William Reinke. He was convicted of defrauding the company of more than \$600,000 by channeling Stealth subcontracts to a company he secretly owned. In another case, a Northrop purchasing agent, Ronald Brousseau, was convicted of rigging contracts in exchange for kickbacks from subcontractors. He described the ease of defrauding black programs to a government informant wearing a concealed tape recorder: "We don't have any heads, we don't have any supervisory people. . . . Nobody questions dollars or anything like that."

Few in Congress can adequately question dollars invested in Stealth technology, or expect satisfactory answers about Stealth's capabilities, said Rep. Mike Synar (D., Okla.), because of "the absolutely adamant refusal by the\*Pentagon\*to release information on Stealth," a refusal Synar called "an insult to Congress."

Synar said his experience in trying to obtain accurate cost figures on the bomber taught him this lesson: "It's obvious that Defense (Department officials) will not be truthful with Congress and the American public when they think it's in their interest."

Stealth is the biggest of the black programs, but other secret military projects absorb billions of defense dollars,\*Pentagon\*documents show. Sophisticated Army and Air Force electronic-warfare systems; Navy programs aimed at disguising U.S. submarines' movements and detecting enemy subs with underwater sensors, and advanced computer, radar, communications and jamming systems are among the projects driving up the black budget.

All are cloaked in the secrecy that traditionally has been reserved for the nation's espionage agencies.

The intelligence community receives more than 75 percent of its funds from the\*Pentagon's\*black budget. The intelligence community's share of the black budget funds the CIA, the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office, as well as the military's intelligence branches. Their budgets appear in no public document.

The CIA's budget, an estimated \$2.5 billion, has more than doubled under the Reagan administration. And no part of it has grown faster than funds for covert operations, now \$600 million or more a year.

But the CIA's budget remains the smallest of those of the three major intelligence agencies. It is dwarfed by the National Security Agency's, which has been placed at \$10 billion.

The NSA is a global vacuum cleaner of intelligence. Its listening posts include ground stations around the world and KH-11 spy satellites orbiting the earth. The satellites and ground stations intercept information from telephones, telexes, microwave transmitters, missiles and satellites. NSA computers can pick out specific conversations from the babble of international telecommunications traffic.

The NSA also conducts surveillance within the United States. A secret court of federal judges, which meets periodically in a secure chamber within the Justice Department, grants the NSA license for domestic operations. Under a secret directive signed by President Reagan, the NSA has access to the computer systems of the IRS, the Social Security Administration and every

other civilian government agency.

No law establishes or limits the powers and responsibilities of the NSA, which was created by a secret, seven-page order signed by President Harry S. Truman in 1952. The NSA regularly spied on American citizens until 1973, when revelations in the Watergate affair ended that practice. The only known mention of the agency in the public laws of the United States is a 1959 statute that states: "Nothing in this act or any other law . . . shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security Agency."

Employing at least 60,000 civilians, and working closely with the\*Pentagon\* from its Fort Meade, Md., headquarters midway between Washington and Baltimore, the NSA also controls the nation's cryptography program, making the codes for U.S. forces and breaking the codes of foreign nations.

The third major espionage agency is the National Reconnaissance Office. Its existence never has been openly acknowledged by the United States. It is an agency so secret that its letterhead is classified. It is known to operate satellite reconnaissance systems under the direction of the Air Force, and it provides photographic data to the intelligence community through a system of space platforms disguised as weather and research satellites. Its budget is estimated at \$4 billion.

All three major espionage agencies overlap with the\*Pentagon\*in their missions. For example, the Army provides cover and personnel for CIA operations, such as the training of the Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, the contras. The\*Pentagon\*controls a variety of intelligence programs, including the entire National Reconnaissance Office, the NSA's spy satellites and code-breaking, research and development of espionage equipment, and submarine surveillance of the Soviet Union.

Most congressional critics of the black budget make a practical distinction between the rapid growth of secret military spending, which they see as largely unjustified, and the black budget for espionage. Few have argued that intelligence programs should suffer public scrutiny.

But even this consensus has been strained by revelations that the CIA has kept Congress in the dark about covert operations of questionable legality, ranging from the mining of Nicaragua's harbors to the arms-for-Iran and cash-for-the-contras deals.

"I'm not against black programs," said Stansfield Turner, who served as CIA director from 1977 to 1981. "But is Congress willing to let these programs go through without knowing what's in them? It's clearly become much more difficult for Congress to get information, and it's clear that congressional oversight has been narrowed. I don't know whether that's a good thing."

#### GRAPHICS: PHOTO (2)

1. (Uncaptioned) The\*Pentagon\*(United Press International)
2. Anatomy of a black budget (The Philadelphia Inquirer)

#### CHART (3)

1. Growth of\*Pentagon's\*secret research and development spending
2. Federal spending by category
3. Air Force black budget (SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense; U.S. Office of Management and Budget; The Philadelphia Inquirer)

#### DIAGRAM (1)

1. One concept of the Stealth bomber (SOURCE: Stealth Aircraft by Bill

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04 PENTAGON & CACHE

PAGE 22

Sweetman, Discover Magazine; The Philadelphia Inquirer / KIRK MONTGOMERY)

KEYWORDS: SERIES US GOVERNMENT FINANCE BUDGET DEFENSE

NUCLEAR WEAPON ESPIONAGE MILITARY CONGRESS RONALD REAGAN

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